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PUTTING BEHAVIORAL STRATEGY INTO PRACTICE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
     Researchers in behavioral strategy are producing new insights on strategic decision making. 
At the same time, a few pioneering companies are discovering ways to put behavioral strategy 
into practice. This paper draws on behavioral research and strategy practice to present an 
approach called diligence-based strategy. In markets comprised of people rather than rational 
economic agents, the analysis of competitive advantages matters less than the diligent execution 
of fundamental activities. Diligence-based strategy offers an applied method for formulating and 
executing strategy in organizations, showing how managers can leverage technology and 
management discipline to drive business success in the 21st century. 
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INTRODUCTION 
     In 2014, Concha y Toro UK (CyT) – an importer-distributer of wines made in Chile, 
Argentina and California – faced a crisis in competitive strategy. Global distributors with 
established brands were moving aggressively into the UK market, smaller entrants were 
experimenting with new business models, and downstream consolidators were shifting the 
balance of power to a few large corporate retailers. Confronted with the threat of eroding market 
share, declining profit margins, and an ageing business model, CyT executives knew something 
had to change. 
     But CyT did not follow the conventional path for managing large-scale strategic change. 
Executives did not articulate a crisis or launch a strategic audit of market trends or competitive 
threats; and the company made no attempt to revolutionize its market strategy or business 
model. Instead, executives turned their attention to a small number of ordinary business 
activities such as procuring inputs, managing customer relationships, and developing people. 
Then, leveraging stakeholder relationships, internet technologies, and social media, the company 
commissioned a new system for monitoring capabilities in fundamental activities for CyT and its 
competitors. From this platform, executives developed improved systems for goal-setting, 
measurement, and allocating resources to the everyday fundamentals of business success. 
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     This renewed commitment to mastering and executing the fundamentals of business success 
– supported by empirical data, internet technologies, and new analytical methods – transformed 
strategy-making at CyT. By deliberately shifting management attention from the traditional 
abstractions of “big strategy” to the daily realities of fundamental business practice, CyT 
executives generated a powerful body of longitudinal data for sensing market shifts, tracking 
competitive activity, setting priorities for investment, and defining new strategic initiatives. 
According to one CyT executive, the shift was “a complete game-changer. Without question, it 
revolutionized the way we think about strategy.”1  
     Competitive and technological conditions in the 21st century are changing the way companies 
conduct their strategy processes. The pace of competition requires executives to strategize and 
act at the same time, to bring internet technologies into the strategy process, and to focus on a 
few highly-leveraged activities that drive business outcomes. In these conditions, some 
executives find that the traditional building blocks of business strategy – analyzing industries, 
choosing the scale and scope of the firm, positioning for competitive advantage, seeking 
differentiated resources and capabilities – have outlived their usefulness. The strategic shift now 
underway at CyT – and in larger consumer companies like PepsiCo and Mars – heralds the 
arrival of something genuinely new, a significant movement that transcends the particulars of any 
method or technique. It may indeed signal a landmark shift in the attitudes of top executives 
toward the practice of strategic management.2  
     The magnitude of the signal is faint but its outlines are clear. Executives no longer believe in 
sustainable competitive advantage as a concept. They have little patience for impressive 
platitudes or drawn-out strategy talk. They attend relentlessly to what they can control, while 
rejecting the notion that strategy and operational excellence, or strategy formation and execution, 
are separable things. They rely more on measurement and evidence, and less on opinions and 
persuasion. They view strategy as a continuous process involving decisions and actions, not as a 
periodic process involving only decisions. They value hard data and quantification but also 
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organization culture, which they construe as shared meaning and disciplined performance 
management. They challenge firm boundaries by embracing open organization, user 
communities, and social media. Learning through trial and error, executives are carving out a 
novel set of strategy principles founded on data, communication technology, and the relentless 
measurement and control of the fundamental activities that determine business success.  
     In developing this approach, managers have paid less attention to academics and consultants 
than to practitioners in other competitive domains. For example, one source for diligence-based 
strategy is the “moneyball” phenomenon, in which baseball executive Billy Beane used advanced 
statistics and activity monitoring to overthrow traditional methods of evaluating baseball talent.3 
In the past decade these techniques have spread through business, sports and other domains. In 
professional golf, PGA and LPGA touring pros keep a close eye on GPS-enabled competitive 
statistics for driving distance, driving accuracy, and average distance from the pin, and on 
technology-enabled swing statistics for clubhead speed, spin rate and launch angle.4 Young 
golfers attend premium academies in Florida, Arizona and Dubai, and study with world-class 
coaches, nutritionists, fitness instructors and psychologists. These players maximize performance 
by applying the new power of technology, statistics, and sports science to the mastery of 
fundamental activities that have always determined success in golf: driving, iron play, hazard play, 
putting, and the mental game. 
      Companies like CyT bring this approach to business competition by focusing on the 
fundamental activities that drive success in any business: activities like developing new products, 
building stakeholder relationships, managing supply chains, serving customers and managing 
culture. This approach is “diligence-based” because it values data, measurement, and behavioral 
perseverance above large-scale strategic ambitions like industry transformation and sustained 
competitive advantage. It is “strategy” because it permeates every aspect of organizational 
strategy, from goal-setting and strategy formation through resource allocation and day to day 
execution.  
Page 3 of 44
UC Berkeley, CMR, 2000 Center Street, Suite 400, Berkeley, CA 94704-1996
California Management Review (cmr.berkeley.edu)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
4 
 
     This paper describes the principles of diligence-based strategy and provides a method for 
putting these ideas into practice. It draws theoretical inspiration from cognitive psychology and 
behavioral research, while rejecting the rationality and efficiency assumptions that entered the 
theory and practice of strategic management through economics. Assuming that markets are 
comprised of human beings rather than rational economic agents, diligence-based strategy shows 
the consequences of bringing realistic assumptions about human behavior to the practice of 
strategic management.  
 
THE CHESS SYNDROME 
     As practiced by large companies and taught in business schools, strategic management is 
largely an art or science of the intellect. Corporations and strategy consultancies employ 
sophisticated analytical tools for understanding markets and internal resources, and MBA 
students learn general theories and techniques for industry analysis, competitive positioning, and 
the internal analysis of the firm. The tools of strategic analysis are widely disseminated and 
embedded in the strategy processes of companies.  
     In using these tools, strategists are vulnerable to a state of mind that might be called the 
“chess syndrome”: the belief that the purpose of strategy is to analyze and choose strategic 
moves. Through training and experience, business strategists learn to assess industry structures, 
recognize patterns in industry and competitive trends, evaluate a company’s competitive 
position, develop and evaluate strategic options, judge probabilities and payoffs of future events, 
and choose the scale, scope, and competitive position of the firm. Because these tasks are 
cognitive and analytical, they suggest parallels between business strategy and other domains in 
which competitive positioning plays an essential role – most notably chess, in which the analysis 
of competitive moves is paramount.5 
     The problem is that chess and business are very different games. Chess grandmasters like 
Magnus Carlsen and Garry Kasparov have extraordinary gifts for recognizing patterns and seeing 
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deeply into potential lines of play. But these mental gifts constitute the whole game of chess. 
Choosing a good chess move is intellectually complex but behaviorally trivial: when a decision is 
made the player reaches across the board and moves the piece to a new square. Implementation 
is swift and unproblematic, and unexpected events never get in the way. Chess players never 
think about strategy execution because chess strategies never fall apart between thinking and 
doing. 
     Ease of execution distinguishes chess from domains of human activity that require both 
thinking and doing, such as mountain climbing. In the past 60 years, mountain climbers have 
discovered 18 different routes up Mount Everest. Most of these routes have been tried more 
than once, and every experienced climber knows which ones offer the greatest probability of 
success. As it happens, 99% of climbers choose the Southeast Ridge from Nepal or the North 
Ridge from Tibet. Statistics show that the Southeast Ridge yields slightly higher success rates and 
fewer deaths, but taking weather and other factors into account, many climbers prefer the North 
Ridge and the success rate there is reasonably high. 
     Unlike chessmasters, climbers of Mount Everest must consider strategy execution, both 
during the climb and while planning the climb. In chess there are 24 possible moves at the 
opening and 10.9 million possible positions by the seventh move. In climbing Everest there are 
only two feasible moves at the start and movement is continuous and effortful. The two feasible 
paths up the mountain are widely known, and climbers do not agonize over the choice of paths. 
Indeed most climbers choose their paths implicitly before deciding whether to go on the 
expedition at all, knowing that the decision entails equifinality of choice (climbers can reach the top 
on either path), randomness (which may hinder or assist the climb), and continuous interaction with 
external forces (such as weather, sherpas, equipment, and other climbers).6  
     These characteristics radically alter the strategy process from beginning to end. Success in 
climbing Everest does not depend on choosing the right path but on the climber’s capacity to 
deal with the conditions of the actual climb. Climbers still have to make choices, but the critical 
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choices do not involve the analysis of paths. They involve mastering the fundamentals of 
mountain climbing, assembling and managing the right team of people, and anticipating and 
dealing with the conditions of the climb. 
     Diligence-based strategy assumes that business strategy is not contemplative like chess, but 
expeditionary like going up Everest. Problems in business strategy are characterized by 
equifinality, randomness and continuous interaction with external forces. In business 
competition, the range of strategic options is always constrained by external conditions and past 
choices, and executives seldom face a large number of feasible paths; in many cases the actual 
number of feasible paths is one.7 In business strategy, good decisions sometimes fail, bad 
decisions succeed, margins for error are large, and the conditions of implementation can erase or 
reverse the core assumptions on which positioning decisions were based. Companies do not fail 
every time an executive chooses the wrong path, and it often happens that the human and 
economic conditions of competition – poor implementation of a bad decision, poor decisions by 
competitors, a favorable demand shift, a lucky change in government regulation, a corporate 
takeover – allow executives to profit from their own mistakes.8 
     This does not mean that business strategists should never think about competitive moves, or 
should avoid strategy tools like decision analysis or scenario analysis. But they should recognize 
that analyzing and choosing competitive moves does not determine a company’s success or 
failure, any more than choosing a good exercise program determines a person’s level of fitness.9 
Almost any fitness program will get results if a person actually does the work, and no fitness 
program will get results if they do not. When implementation is hard, success depends less on 
chess-like mental virtuosity than on Everest-like diligence in executing a small number of 
fundamental activities that are familiar to everyone who plays the game. In allocating scarce top 
management attention, strategy executives should remember that firm performance does not 
come from clever choices but from relentless attention to the fundamental drivers of business 
success. 
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BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS 
     Theories and concepts in strategic management bear the strong imprint of microeconomic 
theory.10 Strategy theories share with economics the assumption that a company cannot beat its 
rivals by adopting widely available practices that are known to improve business performance. 
Strategy theories assume that homogeneous companies perform homogeneously, so a company 
cannot win by imitating its competitors. It can try to do the same things better, but “strategy is 
not operational excellence”:11 if a company adopts a profit-making practice, its rivals – which are 
rational, observant, and open to new ideas – will copy the practice and the market will return to 
the zero-profit equilibrium. The only way a company can gain a performance edge is by building 
sustainable competitive advantages protected by barriers to imitation. 
     These kinds of assumptions are useful to economists studying prices and outputs in market 
competition. However, they are not empirical truths about actual markets comprised of human 
beings. We know, for example, that neither individuals nor groups conform to the assumptions 
of rational actor theory, that people imitate bad practices as well as good ones, and that 
companies neither observe nor imitate each other in the ways assumed by economic theory.12  
     Empirical evidence shows that companies often fail to copy the observable best practices of 
other companies. The literature is vast, but a few examples indicate the direction of the 
evidence.13 For example, Salter found that copper mining companies took as long as 20 years to 
adopt widely available cost-saving rail technologies, and Johnston found that management 
consultants produced efficiency gains as high as 200% by helping their clients install boilerplate 
management control systems. Primeaux showed that the adoption of cost efficient technologies 
varied substantially among large electric utility providers, and Kamberoglou and colleagues, in a 
study of Greek banks, found large differences in the adoption of fundamental management 
practices. In a field experiment of Indian textile producers, Bloom and colleagues offered free 
consulting services and found that the adoption of basic business practices – quality control, 
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inventory management, and HR processes – produced large gains in productivity and 
profitability compared to a control group; and in a sample of more than 700 companies in the 
US, UK, France and Germany, Bloom and Van Reenen found large variations in fundamental 
management practices, reporting a “long tail of badly managed firms” with “surprisingly bad 
management practices.” (2007, p. 1386)  
     According to conventional theories, these disparities in basic management practices should 
not occur. A company should not beat the competition by performing commodity-like activities 
that can be performed by anyone in the market. Companies are not supposed to leave money on 
the ground, or find it there.14 If this happened even to a moderate degree, competitive markets 
would be inefficient and unpredictable. A company with competitive advantages might go out of 
business by failing to implement “hygiene” activities, or a company without competitive 
advantages might beat the competition by diligently implementing ordinary activities. Such 
outcomes would contradict widely held beliefs about strategic management theory and practice. 
     More realistic assumptions about market behavior can be found in the emerging literature on 
behavioral strategy. According to Powell, Lovallo and Fox, behavioral strategy “aims to 
strengthen the empirical integrity and practical usefulness of strategy theory by grounding 
strategic management in realistic assumptions about human cognition, emotion, and social 
interaction.”15 Drawing insights from cognitive and social psychology, behavioral strategy 
challenges the behavioral assumptions of microeconomic theory by treating market efficiency 
and decision rationality as empirical questions to be observed and tested in the actual behavior of 
market participants.16  
     Behavioral research shows that human market participants do not behave like rational 
economic agents. Real people are in many ways more impressive than economic agents. They are 
capable of passion, benevolence, insight and perseverance. They have moral and aesthetic ideals, 
and they exhibit altruism, trust, reciprocity, compassion, justice, loyalty, and love. As in the 
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Moneyball story, people in organizations make seemingly absurd creative leaps that can transform 
an enterprise and alter the dynamics of market competition. 
     At the same time, real people make silly mistakes and misperceive obvious features of their 
environments.17 They display envy, hubris, narcissism and overconfidence. People have limited 
memories and attention spans, unconscious needs and drives they cannot control, and at the 
deepest neural level they are hard-wired for self enhancement and short-term thinking. Research 
shows that executives pay too little attention to competitors and too much attention to 
themselves, leading to competitive blind spots, delusional optimism, cognitive myopia, and a 
“not invented here” mentality. At the group level, people are susceptible to conformity, 
obedience, propaganda, envy, and stereotyping. At the organizational level, companies drift 
imperceptibly into inertia and automatic behavior, taking on rigid and politicized chains of 
command, and cultural norms and ideologies that impede change. At higher levels of collectivity, 
entire sectors fail to perceive new technologies or threats of entry, and executives follow the 
collective sway of “the latest big thing.”  
     By bringing psychological realism to competitive market assumptions, behavioral research 
provides an alternative view of the drivers of firm success and failure. Real companies behave 
paradoxically, giving lip service to profit maximization while neglecting profit opportunities, 
committing unforced errors, and blindly following what other companies are doing. Executives 
promote generous programs of corporate philanthropy while committing moral, social and 
political blunders that are costless to avoid. Companies squander sustainable competitive 
advantages in product design by their inability to perform basic tasks like delivering goods to 
customers. They support local communities while exploiting their environments, and they incur 
reputational damage by violating simple accounting rules and government regulations. They copy 
the best practices of other companies and their worst practices too. The most successful 
enterprises become inert, complacent, and unresponsive to external events.  
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     Diligence-based strategy helps managers navigate competition and strategy in markets 
comprised of people. As one management scholar put it, much of what we observe in markets 
does not stem from economic barriers or cognitive biases, but involves a kind of 
“blockheadedness” that seems psychologically pointless – as when a global automobile producer 
commits a blatant, self-sabotaging lapse in moral judgment.18 By definition, companies cannot 
imitate the inimitable competitive advantages of their rivals; but they can avoid making unforced 
moral errors and destroying their own reputations. If unconscious drives and cognitive biases are 
hardwired into the executive brain, then people cannot eliminate them; but they can enact 
“nudges” and collective processes that mitigate shortcomings, especially biases due to limitations 
of individual memory, attention and learning.19 Seeing competitive markets from a behavioral 
point of view suggests that market opportunities exist for companies that can avoid unforced 
errors and execute on the fundamentals of business success.  
     Research in behavioral strategy suggests that companies can be destroyed by their own 
competitive strengths, by a kind of “curse of competitive advantage.”20 For example, research 
shows that past success provides one of the most fertile breeding grounds for individual and 
social biases, including executive hubris, delusional optimism, overconfidence, competition 
neglect, learning myopia, groupthink, corporate inertia, and cultural stagnation.21 Evidence 
suggests that competitive advantages may carry the psychological seeds of their own destruction, 
as when Polaroid founder Edwin Land’s technological obsessions, which drove the early success 
of the company, blinded Polaroid to new market developments in digital photography.22 
Competitive advantages are psychologically salient to executives and tend to attract large 
resource allocations even when returns to investment are declining, or when disruptive 
innovators are making them obsolete. Competitive strengths are good to have and companies 
should cultivate them; but behavioral research reminds us that the pursuit of outsized 
competitive advantages can impair the company’s vigilance against executive hubris, market 
shifts, and systemic weaknesses in ordinary activities.23  
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     The role of the chief executive is to maximize the performance of the enterprise. This task 
should not be displaced by something else, such as competitive positioning or the pursuit of real 
or imagined competitive advantages. An executive’s primary task is to know the levers that drive 
business performance and to operate those levers, whatever they may be. For a few companies 
this may include the exploitation of big competitive advantages. But how can companies without 
competitive advantages improve competitive performance? And how can companies with 
competitive advantages avoid the curse of competitive advantage? The next section presents a 
diligence-based method for maximizing enterprise performance.  
 
A METHOD FOR DILIGENCE-BASED STRATEGY 
     This section describes a framework and method for diligence-based strategy. The method 
combines elements of the processes followed by companies like CyT and Mars, along with 
frameworks the author has developed independently over a period of years. This approach has 
been put into practice by companies in industries such as financial services, professional services 
and consumer goods, and is applicable to many others. It does not rely on assumptions specific 
to the profit sector, and has been employed in government and non-for-profit organizations, and 
in developed and emerging economies. 
     The method will be described under five headings: (1) Activities, (2) Strategic Capital, (3) 
Priorities, (4) Dynamics, and (5) Measurement. 
(1)  Activities  
     In diligence-based strategy, the basic unit of analysis is the activity. An activity is something 
people do, like developing new services, communicating with suppliers, and processing insurance 
claims. When a company undertakes an activity, the activity becomes a receptacle for executive 
attention, capital investment, resource allocation, strategic initiatives, learning, capability and 
mastery.  
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     As something people do, an activity is observable, measurable, and manageable. It is not an 
intangible or unobservable asset, and it is not a “key success factor” or any other kind of 
“factor.” An activity is both a noun and a verb, a kind of organizational gerund (a noun ending in 
–ing). As a noun, it is something we observe and measure; as a verb, it is a vehicle for getting 
things done: managing, learning, communicating and improving. Activities can always be 
expressed as –ing words, and this is how they are expressed in a diligence-based model. 
     Managers can choose their industries and strategies, and can partially determine what drives 
business success – for example, by choosing a particular business model. But every domain of 
human activity operates within a deep structure of competitive performance, a performance 
function that determines whether a participant succeeds or fails.24 This function is not defined by 
participants but by the “rules of the game,” which reward some activities and punish others. 
Players do not observe this function directly, but discover it by experience, learning, and trial and 
error. People may construe the performance function differently (e.g., from a realist or 
interpretivist perspective), but the performance function is exogenous, serving as a hard 
constraint on enterprise performance.25 
     The performance function is composed of fundamental activities: that is, the crucial activities 
that drive competitive success. By a process of hypothesis-testing and trial and error, executives 
discover which activities drive performance for the enterprise, the relative importance of these 
activities, and their responsiveness to different levels and types of investment.26  
     To initiate diligence-based strategizing, executives should set initial goals or “anchor points” 
for the organization. Typically, this involves identifying enterprise-level goals for growth, 
profitability, innovation, and market coverage, to be revisited later in the strategy process. To 
bridge these goals with fundamental activities, executives should also develop a definition of the 
enterprise – that is, a very short (and provisional) description of the nature and scope of the 
enterprise. From these two foundations – goals and a definition of the enterprise – executives 
can move forward with the diligence-based process. 
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     To identify fundamental activities, executives should ask: What are the fundamental activities 
that drive success in our business? According to the goals and definitions we have set for the 
enterprise, what activities have we committed ourselves to performing and mastering?  
     Fundamental activities must satisfy two criteria: (1) Mastery of the activities contributes 
significantly to organizational performance; and (2) Managers can allocate resources to the 
activities, measure them, and monitor outcomes. In applying these criteria, executives should not 
expect to find a large number of fundamental activities, and experience suggests that a “rule of 
five,” give or take one or two, provides a good balance of breadth and depth for most 
enterprises (in later stages, the method introduces sub-activities that take the analysis to any 
desired level of detail). If a company has five fundamental activities, it is often the case that two 
or three have an external orientation (such as serving customers), and two or three take an 
internal view (such as managing internal culture). 
     The list of fundamental activities can include activities unique to the organization as well as 
generic-sounding activities that would drive success in any organization or sector. For example, 
generic-sounding activities may include: 
- Serving customers 
- Developing new products (or services) 
- Improving brand recognition 
- Building external relationships 
- Benchmarking best practice 
- Managing the supply chain 
- Procuring inputs 
- Distributing products 
- Communicating 
- Developing our people 
- Managing technology 
- Managing internal systems and processes 
- Managing costs 
 
     It should also be noted that diligence-based strategy can be applied at any unit of strategic 
analysis – for example, in a department, project, business-unit or corporate parent. In corporate 
strategy, highly diversified firms like GE and Tata Group have shown that it is possible, by 
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focusing on a handful of fundamental activities at the corporate level (e.g., evaluating and 
integrating acquisitions) and the business-unit level (e.g., managing talent, installing new business 
systems), to create corporate value across a broad range of business units.27 
(2) Strategic Capital  
     Having identified a handful of fundamental activities, executives must then assess how these 
activities work together to drive business success. This constitutes the performance function of 
the enterprise. A company’s capabilities in its fundamental activities work together according to 
the performance function – for example, by summation or multiplication – to create total 
strategic capital (TSC), which is the company’s total capability in its fundamental activities.  
     For ease of exposition, consider an organization that has two fundamental activities, called 
Making (M) and Selling (S). In naming M and S as fundamental activities, executives affirm that 
M and S work together to drive performance for the company. This has specific consequences 
for the strategy process: M and S will be treated as the company’s primary strategic variables; 
executives will set goals for the mastery of M and S; the strategy process will determine resource 
allocations for M and S; and the company will commit itself to the continuous measurement, 
monitoring and management of M and S. 
     Diligence-based strategizing does not employ “box and arrow” models involving linear or 
circular systems of relationships among activities, as in value chain analysis or activity systems.28 
These models can be useful, but the accurate ones have many boxes and feedback loops and can 
be difficult to use in practice. The simple ones are easy to use but offer fewer insights. The 
diligence-based method takes a different approach, focusing on the form of the performance 
function through which activities create total strategic capital for the enterprise. 
     In principle, fundamental activities could produce total strategic capital in many ways: for 
example, if M and S represent the company’s degree of mastery of Making and Selling, the 
performance function could be additive (TSC = M + S); strongest link [TSC = max(M,S)]; 
multiplicative (TSC = M x S); or weakest link [TSC = min(M,S)]. In the additive function, the 
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company could compensate for a deficiency in M by becoming very good at S (or vice versa); in 
the strongest link function, the company could focus on one activity and completely ignore the 
other. Either of these models might produce an impressive “competitive advantage” in a single 
activity. 
     However, for most enterprises the relevant form of performance function is not additive or 
strongest link, but multiplicative.29 The multiplicative function implies that activities are not 
substitutes, but work together in a complementary and supportive way. For example, if the 
function is multiplicative, a company cannot compensate for poor manufacturing by becoming 
extremely good at selling: if the company’s numerical ability for M is zero, then zero multiplies 
through the performance system as a whole, and the company’s total strategic capital is zero.30 In 
general, the multiplicative function tends to reward balanced capabilities in the fundamental 
activities. 
     Multiplicative performance has large consequences for management practice. In the search 
for competitive advantage, most companies tend to over-invest in strengths and under-invest in 
weaknesses. They do this in the mistaken belief that competitive advantage comes from 
strengths instead of from the performance system as a whole. But this is almost never the case: 
in a multiplicative performance system any source of competitive advantage can be nullified by 
weaknesses in other activities. 
     In diligence-based strategy, it is important for managers to gain an intuitive feel for 
multiplicative performance. This does not require a mathematical understanding, but rather an 
intuitive capacity for making resource allocation decisions in a multiplicative system. This is best 
seen in a numerical example, as in Figure 1.  
 
– INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
     Figure 1 shows two companies, Ruby and Indigo. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes 
no capability in an activity and 10 denotes complete mastery, Ruby rates 2 in Making and 8 in 
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Selling; and Indigo rates 6 in Making and 4 in Selling. Ruby has a relative advantage in Selling and 
Indigo has a relative advantage in Making. If Making and Selling are unweighted – that is, equally 
important to performance – then an additive performance function will produce the same total 
strategic capital for the two companies (2 + 8 = 6 + 4 = 10). In a weakest link function, Indigo 
will have more TSC (Indigo’s S = 4; Ruby’s M = 2); in a strongest link performance function, 
Ruby will have more TSC (S = 8); and in a multiplicative function, Indigo will have more TSC (6 
x 4 = 24, compared with 2 x 8 = 16). 
     In the multiplicative performance function, Ruby should not allocate its next unit of resource 
to its strongest activity (Selling): a one unit capability improvement in Selling would improve 
Ruby’s TSC from 16 (2 x 8) to 18 (2 x 9), whereas a one unit capability improvement in Making 
would improve Ruby’s TSC from 16 (2 x 8) to 24 (3 x 8 = 24). Thus, the multiplicative system 
rewards balanced capabilities in a company’s fundamental activities.  
     The “principle of balanced capabilities” can be hard to put into practice. People prefer to 
invest in the capabilities that made them successful in the first place, and organizational politics 
and cultural inertia make it hard for executives to invest away from current strengths. Executives 
are also susceptible to cognitive biases that promote continuity in investment decisions, such as 
the endowment effect, loss aversion, confirmation bias, and the “curse of knowledge.”31 By 
focusing on multiplicative performance, diligence-based strategy guides executives into a 
balanced consideration of the organization’s portfolio of fundamental activities. Executives who 
gain an appreciation for multiplicative performance can avoid common behavioral biases and 
make better overall judgments in resource allocation.32 
(3) Priorities  
     Resource allocation decisions hinge on three factors: a company’s capabilities in its 
fundamental activities; the relative strategic priorities of these activities; and the extent to which 
the activities yield capability improvements in response to new resource allocations. This is 
illustrated numerically in Appendix A, which shows the relative priorities of Making and Selling 
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for Ruby and Indigo, and gives a numerical calculation of resource allocations for four 
performance functions. As shown in Appendix A, activities in a multiplicative system are 
complementary and mutually supportive, so that weak activities multiply through the 
performance system as a whole. The Appendix and accompanying tables (A1 and A2) show how 
the principle of balanced capabilities is adjusted for the effects of strategic priorities in relation to 
existing capabilities.  
 
– INSERT APPENDIX A ABOUT HERE – 
 
     As an aid to management intuition, the conclusions in Appendix A can be reduced to two 
relatively simple heuristics for allocating resources to activities in a multiplicative system: 
Heuristic 1: Managers should allocate resources to fundamental activities in proportion to their relative priorities. 
 
Heuristic 2: Managers should allocate above-normal resources to any activity in which the company has low 
capability relative to its priority. 
 
     Using Heuristic 1, a company with two activities to which it has assigned equal priority (.5) 
should allocate resources equally; if the priorities are .7 and .3, the company should allocate 
resources 70% to the former, 30% to the latter. Most of the time, this heuristic aligns with the 
intuitions of managers and is relatively easy to follow. 
     However, a company’s capabilities can fall out of alignment with priorities, especially if the 
company does not measure or monitor its fundamental activities. In these circumstances, 
managers should not allocate resources according to priorities. Heuristic 2 says that managers 
should allocate above-normal resources to any activity that has fallen below its relative priority. 
This was shown in Appendix A, where Ruby’s relative capability in Making (2/10, or .20) had 
fallen short of its relative priority (.30). According to Heuristic 2, Ruby maximizes total strategic 
capital by allocating resources to Making, the activity with low capability in relation to its priority. 
     In practice, it is Heuristic 2 that presents the most difficulty for managers. Executive 
attention is naturally drawn to the salience of existing strengths and areas of high priority. But an 
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activity of moderate priority that has become a weakness may deliver greater returns to 
investment. The intuition to invest in strengths and top priorities can lead executives astray: 
sometimes the best investments are neither strengths nor priorities, but neglected yet 
fundamental activities in which priorities and capabilities have fallen out of alignment. Heuristic 
2 urges executives to evaluate the full range of fundamental activities, with a view to closing gaps 
between capabilities and priorities. Investing in the highest priority activities would produce good 
decisions if the performance function were additive, and indeed the resource allocation heuristic 
for additive functions always follows Heuristic 1: Allocate resources to the highest-priority activity. But if 
the performance function is multiplicative, resource allocations follow Heuristic 1 only if 
capabilities are perfectly aligned with priorities, which is not generally the case; in most 
circumstances, managers should compare relative capabilities with relative priorities and allocate 
according to Heuristic 2 (also see Sidebar: Additive and Multiplicative Performance). 
 
– INSERT SIDEBAR ABOUT HERE – 
 
     These conclusions assume that all activities yield the same capability improvements in 
response to resource allocations; in other words, that capability improvements can be achieved at 
the same cost for all activities. In practice, this is seldom the case: as companies improve their 
capabilities, further improvements tend to become costlier and more difficult to achieve at the 
margin. In learning and experience curves with a fixed upper limit (like a 0 to 10 scale), 
improving from 9 to 10 is harder than improving from 3 to 4. Thus, managers must consider the 
comparative responsiveness of fundamental activities to new resource investments at the margin. 
     This problem corresponds exactly to the standard economic problem of optimizing factors of 
production in the maximization of output.33 However, managers do not need to perform these 
calculations. The essential point for managers is that the effect of “diminishing marginal 
improvements” makes it even more imperative that they attend carefully to weaknesses in 
fundamental activities: the existence of low-cost, unexploited learning opportunities means that 
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resources often yield greater returns on investment – that is, greater relative increases in total 
strategic capital – when allocated to weaker activities.   
    Figure 2 shows how the diligence-based method displays capabilities for a hypothetical 
consumer products company with five fundamental activities. The figure uses three methods for 
displaying activities: column chart, radar chart, and bar chart. In practice, the author uses a 
column chart, but companies like CyT and Mars use bar charts. The five activities are: 
Developing New Products, Improving Manufacturing Productivity, Developing Internal Culture, 
Marketing to Consumers, and Building Relationships with Retailers. 
 
– INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE – 
 
     The three charts in Figure 2 present the same information in different formats, indicating the 
extent of the company’s capability for each activity on a scale from 0 (no capability) to 10 
(complete mastery). The column and bar charts also show total strategic capital (TSC), which is 
calculated using the multiplicative function, weighted by priorities.34 Relative priorities are 
represented as proportions, and are shown in the table at the bottom of Figure 2. 
(4) Dynamics  
     In determining resource allocations, managers should look for discrepancies between the 
priority of activities and existing capabilities. If relative priorities and capabilities are aligned, then 
Heuristic 1 applies and the company can allocate resources in proportion to priority (adjusted for 
costs). If not, as in Table 1, managers should examine the magnitudes of any discrepancies and 
determine which activities are candidates for above-normal resource allocation. In Table 1, 
capabilities are significantly lower than priorities for two activities – Developing Culture and 
Building Relationships with Retailers – and also for Developing New Products.35 
 
– INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
Page 19 of 44
UC Berkeley, CMR, 2000 Center Street, Suite 400, Berkeley, CA 94704-1996
California Management Review (cmr.berkeley.edu)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
20 
 
     Once the basic framework of activities and priorities is established, the diligence-based 
method gives managers a versatile platform for tracking industry and competitive dynamics, and 
for driving organizational change. The method’s measurement disciplines (discussed below) are 
designed to bring the company into closer contact with its customers and suppliers, allowing 
managers to sense competitive shifts and anticipate new trends in business models and 
technologies. Comparisons with rivals give managers new insights into the latest industry 
standards for quality and capability, showing them which companies are raising the bar on 
fundamental activities (managers at CyT analyze competitors using charts like those in Figure 2, 
overlaying the profiles of rivals onto those of the organization). Indeed, diligence-based thinking 
encourages capability innovation by prompting executives to monitor the frontiers of capability 
advance in its sector, and by providing methods and measures for evaluating the impacts of new 
technologies and business practices.36  
     The method’s emphasis on activities leads naturally to discussions of organizational 
boundaries: if the company has a chronic weakness that responds poorly to investment, the 
activity becomes a candidate for outsourcing; if the company excels in an activity that responds 
well to investment, managers can explore business models for maximizing its impacts; if rivals 
are launching new activities (such as building online communities for crowdsourcing), managers 
can consider reshaping the company’s profile of activities.  
     The diligence-based method facilitates concrete, evidence-driven strategy conversations that 
connect market positions to the dynamic challenges of putting them into practice. It can be used 
in conjunction with a broad range of established techniques for analyzing options for strategic 
investment, including methods for alternative generation, probability and payoff estimation, 
decision making, and evaluation of uncertainty (such as scenario planning).37 The method 
provides a strategic audit trail of capability improvement and an early-warning system for 
technological and market shifts. In practice, companies like CyT find that the benefits of 
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diligence-based strategizing increase over time, yielding dynamic comparisons with rivals and a 
longitudinal evidence record of resource allocations and outcomes.38 
(5) Measurement  
     Diligence-based strategy requires systems of activity measurement and performance 
management, along with management and communication practices for supporting these 
systems. These systems do not have to be costly or highly formalized, or developed all at once. 
The culture and mission of some organizations will suggest a lighter touch, whereas other 
organizations may take a more robust approach. Whether the method is robust or light-touch, 
the crucial requirement is to place fundamental activities at the heart of organizational strategy.  
     To put a measurement system into place, managers should identify the component sub-
activities that form the basis for the organization’s fundamental activities. Sub-activities supply 
the observability and specificity required for effective measurement. For example, the 
fundamental activity “developing new products” may be composed of sub-activities like 
researching new product technologies, seeking ideas from customers, developing product 
prototypes, and pilot-testing with customers. The activity “developing our people” may be 
composed of sub-activities like holding weekly meetings with employees, developing a career 
plan for each employee, involving people in strategy conversations, and linking individual goals 
to organizational outcomes. As with fundamental activities, five sub-activities seems to be a 
manageable number in practice (at CyT the number ranges from four to seven). 
     Sub-activities can be measured using the same numerical scales employed for fundamental 
activities. This enables managers to combine the capability ratings for sub-activities into a 
composite capability rating for the fundamental activity as a whole. Thus, for example, CyT uses 
ratings for four sub-activities – managing brand reputation, providing brand marketing support, 
creating innovative product packaging, and managing new product launches – to derive a 0 to 
100 rating for the fundamental activity “supporting consumer marketing.”39 
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     To obtain these ratings, CyT works closely with external consultants to gather detailed 
feedback from external stakeholders.40 For the activity “supporting consumer marketing,” the 
most crucial and informed stakeholders are the five largest retail supermarkets in the UK 
through which CyT distributes its products. Using web-based surveys of multiple respondents in 
each retailer – supported by follow-up contacts by phone, Skype or face to face – CyT managers 
work with the consulting team to compile a detailed profile of CyT’s capabilities for each sub-
activity. At the same time, the surveys produce comparative ratings for CyT’s seven largest 
competitors, allowing managers to use comparative bar charts and other forms of analysis. 
Retailers also receive feedback from the surveys, which improves data reliability and retailer 
response rates. 
     In diligence-based strategy, managers should use every available technology and data source 
to compile data on the company’s activities. This varies by sector, and from one activity to 
another. For externally-facing activities, sources include quantitative data from online databases, 
a dedicated website for data gathering, web surveys, blogs, social media feeds, and data provided 
by consultancies and industry experts; for internally-facing activities, they include blogs, 
anonymous surveys, open forums, and data obtained in performance appraisal systems; for 
activities related to efficiency or productivity, they include numerical data for input, output, and 
defect rates. Companies lacking a strong track record of customer or stakeholder engagement 
can use diligence-based strategy as the catalyst for launching new programs of technology-
enabled communication with customers and suppliers.  
     An organization that has four sub-activities for each of five fundamental activities will collect 
data for 20 sub-activities. This is achievable for most organizations. For presentation, each 
fundamental activity is charted and these charts are supported by charts for each sub-activity. 
This becomes the documentation for resource allocation and strategic decision making. At CyT 
each fundamental activity has its own chart, which gives the ratings for each sub-activity (like the 
horizontal bar chart in Figure 2). As supporting documentation, each sub-activity has a chart 
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showing how the sub-activity was measured. These pages, along with summary charts and 
conclusions, constitute the playbook for diligence-based strategizing at CyT. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
     Diligence-based strategy offers a theoretically-grounded philosophy of strategic management, 
and an applied method for formulating and executing strategy in organizations. Drawing on 
psychology and behavioral strategy, the theory and method are founded on the premise that 
organizations achieve superior performance not by thinking about how to obtain competitive 
advantages, but by the thoughtful doing of activities fundamental to success. 
     Diligence-based strategy did not appear all at once, and is still in development.41 Its 
foundations reach at least to the 1950s, when social scientists Herbert Simon and James March 
introduced concepts such as bounded rationality, group identification, and political bargaining to 
the study of organizations. In the 1960s, Harvard economist Harvey Leibenstein developed the 
concept of “x-inefficiency,” showing the prevalence of inefficiency in firms and competitive 
markets. Behavioral economists like Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman challenged 
mainstream economic assumptions about decision rationality, showing the impacts of cognitive 
biases on strategic decision making. In strategic management research, scholars observed the 
misleading effects of adopting the efficiency and equilibrium assumptions of economic theory, 
and Bromiley and Rau developed a “practice-based view” of strategy. For executive strategists, 
Amar Bhide wrote about the importance of “hustle,” Pfeffer and Sutton highlighted the 
“knowing-doing gap,” Frery and colleagues wrote on “the innovative use of ordinary resources,” 
and executives like Lou Gerstner of IBM, Andy Grove of Intel, and Larry Bossidy of Allied 
Signal wrote best-selling books linking strategy to the execution of fundamentals.  
     It is possible to argue from historical evidence that the most successful companies – from 
GE to Intel to Google – have always practiced diligence-based strategy, and that scholarly work 
in behavioral strategy has come very late to the game. The diligence-based approach works in 
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practice because it does not demand the impossible from executives, but focuses on things 
managers can actually control. Executives cannot control genius, luck or the imitation of 
inimitable competitive advantages. But they can produce outcomes indistinguishable from 
genius, luck or competitive advantages by focusing diligently on things they can control. 
     The diligence-based approach does not reject traditional approaches to strategy, but urges 
managers to think carefully about how these methods are used. Economics-based methods 
neglect the human and behavioral realities of strategic management, and are poorly adapted to 
environments characterized by social complexity, political uncertainty, and economic 
inefficiency. In prioritizing the pursuit of competitive advantages, older methods focus executive 
attention on the pure cognition of goal setting, understanding industry structures, planning 
competitive positions, and analyzing resource advantages. By focusing executive attention on 
people and behavior, diligence-based strategy helps executives drive performance in human 
environments that reward diligence, perseverance, and a capacity for getting things done. 
     From an economic point of view, someone might ask: Is diligence-based strategy really 
strategy? Isn’t strategy concerned with setting goals, choosing products, setting price and quality 
levels, deciding whether to enter markets, and making acquisition decisions? Isn’t strategy “big”? 
     From a diligence-based perspective, strategy is what executives do to create successful 
outcomes, whatever this may entail. If success entails goal-setting and making big decisions, then 
this is what executive strategists should do. But in human markets characterized by equifinality of 
choice, randomness, and difficult and uncertain implementation, success tends to depend less on 
“big strategy” than on the relentless management of disciplined action. 
     The purpose of diligence-based strategy is to help managers develop and deliver effective 
strategies. It is not an operational or tactical program, a checklist of factors, or a boxes-and-
arrows system of transactions. Diligence-based strategy can equally promote market disruption 
or manufacturing productivity, market exploration or resource exploitation, radical innovation or 
systems efficiency. Ironically, many executives find that only by thinking “small” – focusing on 
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business fundamentals rather than big strategic moves – can a company discover and enact the 
big moves traditionally associated with competitive strategy, such as developing new 
technologies and capturing market opportunities. If the method seems more operational than 
conventional strategy models, the problem may ultimately rest with conventional models. 
Strategy is about creating successful outcomes, and it is possible that the old dogma that 
separated strategy from operations, and strategy formation from strategy execution, has outlived 
its usefulness in strategic management. 
     The diligence-based method is not tied to a particular industry or geography, or to the profit 
sector. It can be used in all organizations and in sub-units at all levels. It is adaptable to the 
pursuit of financial or non-financial goals. Technology-enabled measurement of fundamental 
activities provides a powerful guide and “nudge” to human performance in every domain of 
activity. The diligence-based approach facilitates strategy-making in business, sports and politics, 
and can help individuals plan for personal or career success. In all areas of life, diligence-based 
strategy points the way to superior performance by showing people how to capture opportunities 
in a world comprised of other people very much like themselves. 
 
NOTES 
                                                            
1 We gratefully acknowledge the support of the CyT management team, especially Nicola Hale 
and Alastair Collier, who gave generously of their time and supplied access to the CyT strategy 
process and documentation.  
  
2 The new approach borrows some elements from existing strategy and operational frameworks, 
recombining them in new ways. For example, CyT’s emphasis on activities is reminiscent of 
value chains and activity systems, and its emphasis on measurement and execution resembles 
TQM, Six Sigma and the balanced scorecard system. See: M.E. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New 
York: Free Press, 1985); M.E. Porter, “What is Strategy?,” Harvard Business Review, (November-
December 1996): 61-78; R.S Kaplan and D.P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy 
into Action (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996). At the same time, the new approach 
has its own theory, method and behavioral assumptions, as described in the paper. 
 
3 M. Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2003). 
 
4 For example, see T. Hulse, “A Whole New Ball Game?” Business Life, (May, 2015): 30-31. 
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5 See, for example, G. Kasparov, How Life Imitates Chess (London: William Heinemann, 2007). 
 
6 Equifinality applies when more than one path leads to the same end. The concept was 
introduced to systems theory by Ludwig von Bertalanffy and is a standard concept in open 
systems theories of organization. See L. von Bertalanffy General Systems Theory (New York, NY: 
George Braziller, 1968); D. Katz and R.L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (2nd Edition) 
(New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1978). 
 
On the role of randomness in strategy and organization, see: 
 
J. Denrell, C. Fang, and C. Liu, “Chance Explanations in the Management Sciences,” Published 
on-line first at Organization Science (2015). DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2014.0946 
 
J. Denrell, “Random Walks and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” Management Science, 50 (2004): 
922-934. 
 
D.A. Levinthal, “Random Walks and Organizational Mortality,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 
(1991): 397-420. 
 
     On the decoupling of strategic choices from strategic actions, see: 
 
H. Mintzberg and J. Waters, “Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic Management 
Journal, 6 (1985): 257-272. 
 
H. Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (New York: Free Press, 1994). 
 
W.H. Starbuck, Organizations as Action Generators, American Sociological Review, 48 (1983): 91-
102. 
 
7 See, for example, D. Lovallo and O. Sibony, “The Case for Behavioral Strategy,” McKinsey 
Quarterly (March, 2010): 30-43. 
 
8 J. Denrell and C. Liu, “Top Performers are not the Most Impressive When Extreme 
Performance Indicates Unreliability,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109/24 (2012): 
9331-9336. 
 
9 For example, research suggests that people are overconfident in their ability to control their 
own future behavior. See: S. DellaVigna and U. Malmendier, “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” 
American Economic Review, 96/3 (2006): 694-719. 
 
We are grateful to an anonymous referee, who made the point that good and bad choices may 
not be symmetrical: choosing a good path does not guarantee success, but choosing a truly bad 
one (e.g., a hazardous path up Mount Everest) could guarantee disaster.  
 
10 For example, see: D. Teece, “Economic Analysis and Strategic Management,” California 
Management Review, 26/3 (Spring 1984): 87-110. 
 
See also: 
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R.D. Rumelt, D. Schendel and D. Teece, “Strategic Management and Economics,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 12 (1991, Winter Special Issue): 5–29. 
 
R. Nag, D.C. Hambrick, M.J. Chen, “What is Strategic Management, Really? Inductive 
Derivation of a Consensus Definition of the Field,” Strategic Management Journal, 28 (2007): 935-
955. 
 
11 The quote is the first section heading (p. 61) in M.E. Porter, “What is Strategy?,” Harvard 
Business Review, (November-December 1996): 61-78. 
 
12 On the imitation of bad practices, see:  
 
E. Abrahamson, “Managerial Fads and Fashion: The Diffusion and Rejection of Innovations,” 
Academy of Management Review 16 (1991): 586-612. 
 
F. Vermeulen, “How Bad Practice Prevails: A Model of the Diffusion and Persistence of 
Detrimental Management Practice,” paper presented at the 2006 Strategic Management Society 
Annual Meetings, Vienna. 
 
13 The references for this paragraph are as follows: 
 
W.E. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960).   
 
J. Johnston, “The Productivity of Management Consultants,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: 
Series A, (1963): 237-249. 
 
W.J. Primeaux, “An Assessment of X-Efficiency gained through Competition,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 59 (1977): 105-108. 
 
N.C. Kamberoglou, E. Liapis, G.T. Simigiannis, and P. Tzamourani, “Cost Efficiency in Greek 
Banking,” Bank of Greece Working Paper No. 9 (January 2004). 
 
N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen, “Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms 
and Countries,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122/4 (2007): 1351-1408. 
 
N. Bloom, B. Eifert, A. Mahajan, D. McKenzie, and J. Roberts, “Does Management Matter? 
Evidence from India,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128/1 (2013): 1-51. 
 
     See also: N. Bloom, R. Sadun, and J. Van Reenen, “The Radical Beauty of Three Simple 
Management Practices,” Harvard Business Review, (October 29, 2012); and N. Bloom, R. Sadun, 
and J. Van Reenen, “Does Management Really Work?” Harvard Business Review, 90/11 
(November, 2012): 76-82. 
 
     Productivity studies also show large inefficiencies in basic industries like farming, fishing and 
railroads. See: D.J. Aigner, C.A.K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt, “Formulation and Estimation of 
Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 6 (1977): 21-37; S.C. 
Kumbhakar, “Estimation of Input-Specific Technical and Allocative Inefficiency in Stochastic 
Frontier Models,” Oxford Economic Papers, 40 (1988): 535-549; and W. Meeusen and J. Van den 
Broeck, “Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas Production Functions with Composed 
Error,” International Economic Review, 18 (1977): 435-444. 
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14 J. Denrell, C. Fang, and S.G. Winter, “The Economics of Strategic Opportunity,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 24 (2003): 977-990.  
 
15 T.C. Powell, D. Lovallo, and C. Fox, “Behavioral Strategy,” Strategic Management Journal, 32 
(2011): 1369-1386. 
 
16 See T.C. Powell, “Strategic Management and the Person,” Strategic Organization, 12 (2014): 200-
207. 
 
17 References for this paragraph and the next are as follows:  
 
D. Lovallo and D. Kahneman, “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ 
Decisions,” Harvard Business Review, (July 2003): 56-63. 
 
D.A. Levinthal and J.G. March, “The Myopia of Learning,” Strategic Management Journal, 14 
(1993): 95-112.  
 
E.J. Zajac and M.H. Bazerman, “Blind Spots in Strategic Decision-Making: The Case of 
Competitor Analysis,” Academy of Management Review, 16 (1991): 37-56. 
 
J. Nickerson and T. Zenger, “Envy, Comparison Costs, and the Economic Theory of the Firm,” 
Strategic Management Journal, 29/13 (2008): 1371-1394. 
 
E. Abrahamson and C.J. Fombrun, “Macrocultures: Determinants and Consequences,” Academy 
of Management Review, 19/4 (1994): 728-755. 
 
T.C. Powell, D. Lovallo, and C. Fox, “Behavioral Strategy,” Strategic Management Journal, 32 
(2011): 1369-1386. 
 
T.C. Powell, “Neurostrategy,” Strategic Management Journal, 32 (2011): 1484-1499. 
T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (eds), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 
I.L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). 
 
I.L. Janis and L. Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment 
(New York: Free Press, 1977). 
 
D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
 
D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
  
D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (eds), Choices, Values and Frames (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
 
D. Antons and F.T. Piller. “Opening the Black Box of ‘Not Invented Here’: Attitudes, Decision 
Biases, and Behavioral Consequences,” Academy of Management Perspectives 29/2 (2015): 193-217. 
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R.E. Nisbett and L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980). 
 
M.H. Bazerman and D.A. Moore, Judgment in Managerial Decision-Making, 7th ed, (New York: Wiley 
and Sons, 2009). 
 
G. Loewenstein, Exotic Preferences: Behavioral Economics and Human Motivation (New York: Oxford 
University Press USA, 2007). 
 
F. Vermeulen, “How Bad Practice Prevails: A Model of the Diffusion and Persistence of 
Detrimental Management Practice,” paper presented at the Strategic Management Society 
Annual Meetings, Vienna, 2006. 
   
18 The 2015 Volkswagen scandal, in which executives manipulated the testing of carbon 
monoxide emissions. Also see: T.C. Powell, “Strategy, Execution and Idle Rationality,” Journal of 
Management Research, 4/2 (2004): 77-98. 
 
19 R.H. Thaler and C.R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 
(New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 
 
D. Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference (London: W.H. 
Allen, 2015). 
 
C. Heath, R.P. Larrick, and J. Klayman, “Cognitive Repairs: How Organizations Compensate for 
the Shortcomings of Individual Learners,” Research in Organizational Behavior, 20 (1998): 1-37. 
 
R.P. Larrick, “Debiasing,” In Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, D.J Koehler and 
N. Harvey (eds), (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2004): 316-337. 
 
S. Postrel and R.P. Rumelt, “Incentives, Routines and Self-Command,” Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 1/3 (1992): 397-425. 
 
P.E. Tetlock, “Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure 
Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 45/2 (2000): 293-326. 
 
20 For example, see: 
 
A. Chatterjee and D.C. Hambrick, “CEO Personality, Capability Cues, and Risk-Taking: How 
Narcissists React to their Successes and Stumbles,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 56/2 (2011): 
202-237. 
 
B.M. Staw, P.I. McKechnie, and S.M. Puffer, “The Justification of Organizational Performance,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 28 (1983): 582-600. 
 
M.H. Bazerman and W.D. Watkins, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2004). 
 
B.M. Staw, “The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action,” Academy of Management 
Review, 6 (1981): 577-587. 
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D. Miller, The Icarus Paradox: How Exceptional Companies Bring About Their Own Downfall (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992). 
 
J. Pfeffer and C.T. Fong, “Building Organization Theory from First Principles: The Self-
Enhancement Motive and Understanding Power and Influence,” Organization Science, 16/4 (2005): 
372–388. 
 
M.A. Hayward and D.C. Hambrick, “Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: 
Evidence of CEO Hubris,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 42/1 (1997): 103-127. 
 
A. Chatterjee and D.C. Hambrick, “It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and 
their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 52 (2007): 
351-386. 
 
21 See Endnote 17. 
 
22 D. Miller, The Icarus Paradox: How Exceptional Companies Bring About Their Own Downfall (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992). 
 
23 See: J. Denrell and C. Liu, “Top Performers are not the Most Impressive When Extreme 
Performance Indicates Unreliability,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109/24 (2012): 
9331-9336. 
 
On the decline of sustainable competitive advantages, see: 
 
R.A. D’Aveni, G. Battista Dagnino, and K. G. Smith, “The Age of Temporary Advantage,” 
Strategic Management Journal, 31 (2010): 1371-1385. 
 
R.A. D’Aveni, Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic Maneuvering (New York: Free 
Press, 1994). 
 
24 This is comparable to adaptation on rugged landscapes; for example, see:  
 
D.A. Levinthal, “Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes” Management Science, 43/7 (1997): 934-950. 
 
J. Rivkin and N. Siggelkow, “Organizational Sticking Points on NK Landscapes,” Complexity, 7/5 
(2002): 31-43. 
 
25 See: B. Fay, “Critical Realism?,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20/1 (March 1990): 33-
41; and K.E. Weick, Making Sense of the Organization (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
 
     In the above article, Fay compares the process of human discovery to playing the board game 
Mastermind. In Mastermind, the player attempts to discover a pre-selected code consisting of 
four pegs of different colors, which are covered by a shield. On each turn, the player guesses the 
code and receives information about the correctness of guesses. Fay writes: “The cosmos 
consists of an unknown but causally operative structure which is objectively ‘there’; science is the 
attempt to replicate this structure through a process of hypothesis formation and testing; and a 
true theory is one which exactly duplicates the pre-existing structure.” (p. 36)  
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     Both Fay and Karl Weick argued that people in the real world cannot be sure that the 
“underlying code” actually exists; or if it exists, whether people can discover it. Fay writes: 
“There isn’t any One True Map of the earth, of human existence, of the universe, or of Ultimate 
Reality, a Map supposedly embedded inside these things; there are only maps we construct to 
make sense of the welter of our experience, and only us to judge whether these maps are 
worthwhile for us or not.” (p. 38).  
     The diligence-based approach can accommodate either a realist interpretation (“there is a real 
underlying code”) or a constructionist or “pragmatist” interpretation (“the underlying code is not 
objectively real, but constructed by people as an aid and analogy for problem-solving”). 
 
26 Under equifinality of choice, industry landscapes allow more than one path to high 
performance. For example, a firm might achieve the same success using a strategy of (a) equally-
weighted capabilities in distributing and marketing, or (b) unequally weighted capabilities in 
producing and serving customers. Diligence-based strategy assumes that executives can choose 
(a) or (b) as the company’s strategy or business model (or they can choose others), and they can 
choose freely among all feasible allocations of resources. However, as in economic theory, 
executives cannot in the short run choose the extent to which any business model is rewarded by 
the environment. This is a feature of the environment, which decision makers must learn by 
allocating resources to activities and observing their effects. 
     In practice, the performance function is both uncertain (at any point in time) and potentially 
unstable (over time). Executives can reduce uncertainty by engaging in market search, gathering 
information from a variety of sources, and observing the effects of resource allocations (as 
described in the text).  
 
27 Jack Welch’s philosophy of “Ponder less and do more” is consistent with diligence-based 
strategy. See: J. Welch with S. Welch, Winning (New York: Harper Business, 2005), p. 166.     
 
28 See, for example: J. Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2000); J.W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1961); M.E. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York: Free Press, 1985); and M.E. Porter, 
“What is Strategy?,” Harvard Business Review, (November-December 1996): 61-78.   
 
29 In a multiplicative performance function, activities complement each other, whereas in an 
additive function they are substitutes. For example, if more efficient production increases the 
payoffs to a sales training program, the performance function is multiplicative.  
     Complementarity in organizations is discussed in J. Roberts, The Modern Firm (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). An argument for the multiplicative function in human 
competition can be found in D.K. Simonton, “Talent and its Development: An Emergenetic and 
Epigenetic Model,” Psychological Review, 106/3 (1999): 435-457 (See also Simonton’s sources on 
multiplicative performance and “emergenetic” processes, p. 438). The standard economic 
framing for multiplicative factors of production is the “Cobb-Douglas production function” and 
its variants. There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature, the original statement being: C.W. 
Cobb and P.H. Douglas, “A Theory of Production,” The American Economic Review, 18 
(Supplement, 1928): 139–165.  
     Although the most common performance function in organizations is multiplicative, hybrid 
combinations are possible: for example, a multiplicative function with one additive activity. 
 
30 This differs from a weakest link model, in which TSC always matches the company’s capability 
in its worst activity. For example, if Company A has capabilities rated 2 and 3, and Company B 
has capabilities rated 1 and 9, Company A is the higher performer in a weakest link model (2 is 
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the lowest-rated activity), but Company B is the higher performer in a multiplicative model (1 x 9 
= 9 exceeds 2 x 3 = 6). 
 
31 On ideologies, politics, and organizational barriers to strategic change, see: S. Jonsson and P. 
Regner, “Normative Barriers to Imitation: Social Complexity of Core Competences in a Mutual 
Fund Industry, Strategic Management Journal, 30/5 (2009): 517-536; N. Brunsson, “The Irrationality 
of Action and Action Rationality: Decisions, Ideologies and Organizational Action,” Journal of 
Management Studies, 19/1 (1982): 29-44; and A.D Meyer and W.H. Starbuck, “Interactions 
between Politics and Ideologies in Strategy Formation,” in New Challenges to Understanding 
Organizations, K. Roberts, ed, (New York: Macmillan, 1993): 99-116. 
     Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert Sutton argued that companies do many things that effectively 
sabotage their own efforts to learn and improve, such as fostering cultures in which people feel 
pressured and afraid to fail, and “dumping technology on the problem,” i.e., adopting formal 
knowledge management programs that decouple learning from tacit forms of human interaction 
and organizational values. Their prescriptions for learning – e.g., encouraging experimentation, 
and embedding change programs in organizational culture and values – apply equally to the 
diligence-based method. See J. Pfeffer and R. Sutton. “Knowing What to Do is Not Enough: 
Turning Knowledge into Action,” California Management Review 42/1 (1999): 83-108. 
     On loss aversion, see A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A 
Reference-Dependent Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1991): 1039-1061; on 
confirmation bias, see D.T. Gilbert, D.S. Krull, and P.S. Malone, “Unbelieving the Unbelievable: 
Some Problems in the Rejection of False Information,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
59 (1990): 601-613. 
     On the “curse of knowledge,” a term credited to behavioral economist Robin Hogarth, see: 
C. Camerer, G. Loewenstein, and M. Weber, “The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: 
An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy 97/5 (1989): 1232–1254. The intuitive 
version of the argument is that people find it hard to unlearn what they already know, or to take 
actions that require ignoring what they know (or think they know). 
 
32 How can managers know if their organization’s performance function is multiplicative? The 
best way to evaluate the function is to ask: Would a capability reduction in one of our core 
activities reduce our effectiveness in other activities? Note that this is not the same as asking 
whether a capability reduction in a core activity would make the company worse off, to which 
the answer should be “yes” (if a manufacturer becomes less capable of procuring quality 
components, this will hurt the company even if the performance function is additive). But if the 
same decline hurts the company secondarily by reducing the effectiveness or efficiency of the 
manufacturing process (say, due to higher error rates), or makes the sales task more costly (due 
to lower product quality), or creates a ripple effect in customer service (due to reputational 
decline or higher warranty costs), then the system is multiplicative. This means that lower 
capability in one activity has negative spillover effects for other activities, reducing their 
effectiveness and multiplying through the performance system as a whole. In a similar way, an 
improved capability in one activity can have positive spillovers for other activities and positive 
multiplier effects for the performance system as a whole. 
     From a behavioral point of view, managers can ask: How effectively could we carry on our 
business without direct communication or coordination across core activities? Could our 
activities be conducted in a “stand-alone” or purely modular way? The multiplicative 
performance function assumes that core activities are not modular but complementary, requiring 
communication and behavioral coordination. 
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33 The standard treatment for two variables in microeconomics is to represent relative input costs 
as a line overlaid on the map of production isoquants, with optimal production at the point of 
tangency (see Sidebar). These calculations can be performed algebraically for any number of 
activities. On the other hand, the diligence-based method does not require these kinds of 
mathematical calculations. The main point for managers is to appreciate that cost tradeoffs play a 
role in resource allocation decisions in a multiplicative system. 
 
34 Scaling from 0 to 10 is not essential; CyT uses a scale from 0 to 100, and the minimum could 
be set at one rather than zero. 
 
35 Quantitative analysis using the weighted multiplicative model, assuming equal costs of 
capability improvement for all activities, shows that one unit of added capability has the greatest 
impact on total strategic capital when applied to Developing Culture (TSC rises by .36), followed 
by Building Relationships with Retailers (+.27), Developing New Products (+.22), Improving 
Productivity (+.09), and Marketing to Consumers (+.06). 
 
36 For example, if distributing products is a fundamental activity for Company A, and Company 
B introduces a more efficient system for distributing products, the “bar” for competitive mastery 
rises and Company A’s relative capability declines. Thus, a company’s capability can decline from 
6/10 to 4/10 even if its absolute capability is unchanged; or its capability can remain the same 
despite absolute improvements in capability. This “red queen effect” requires executives to 
attend closely to the frontiers of capability mastery in its sector. 
   
37 For example, see R. Keeney, “Value-Focused Thinking: Identifying Decision Opportunities 
and Creating Alternatives,” European Journal of Operational Research 92 (1996): 537-549; R. Keeney, 
J. Hammond, and H. Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Life Decisions (Boston 
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998); D. Lovallo and O. Sibony, “Distortions and 
Deceptions and Distortions in Strategic Decisions,” McKinsey Quarterly (2006/1): 19-29; P. 
Schoemaker , “Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking,” MIT Sloan (Winter 1995): 25-
40; P. Schoemaker and P. Tetlock, “Taboo Scenarios: How to Think about the Unthinkable,” 
California Management Review 54/2 (Winter 2012): 5-24. 
 
38 This is consistent with the concept of “dynamic capabilities,” but derived from different 
assumptions. Diligence-based strategy is not trying to explain “why certain firms build 
competitive advantage in regimes of rapid change” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997, p. 516), and 
it does not employ the distinction between baseline capabilities and “dynamic capabilities.” In 
diligence-based strategy, managers maximize performance not by creating “higher-order” 
capabilities, but by managing fundamental activities. This is perhaps more consistent with the 
Eisenhardt-Martin view of dynamic capabilities. See, for example: 
 
D.J. Teece, G. Pisano and A. Shuen, “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 18 (1997): 509-533.  
 
D.J. Teece, “Explicating Dynamic Capabilities: The Nature and Microfoundations of 
(Sustainable) Enterprise Performance,” Strategic Management Journal, 28/13 (2007): 1319–1350. 
 
K.M. Eisenhardt and J.A. Martin, “Dynamic Capabilities: What Are They?” Strategic Management 
Journal, 21/10 (2000): 1105–1121. 
 
M. Peteraf, G. Di Stefano, and G. Verona, “The Elephant in the Room of Dynamic Capabilities: 
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FIGURE 1: 
COMPARING RUBY AND INDIGO 
 
 
Total Strategic Capital: Ruby and Indigo 
Fundamental Activity Ruby Indigo Winner 
Making 2 6   
Selling 8 4   
        
TSC: Additive 10 10 Tie 
TSC: Weakest Link 2 4 Indigo 
TSC: Strongest Link 8 6 Ruby 
TSC: Multiplicative 16 24 Indigo 
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APPENDIX A: 
ALLOCATING RESOURCES TO ACTIVITIES 
 
     Table A1 shows the relative priorities of Making and Selling for Ruby and Indigo, and gives a 
numerical calculation of resource allocations for four performance functions. These include two 
of the original four functions (Additive and Multiplicative) and two new functions that weight 
the capabilities by relative priority (Weighted Additive and Weighted Multiplicative).  
 
– INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
     To produce a numerical index for TSC that follows the original 0 to 10 scale, all functions are 
averaged.i Thus, the Additive function is the average of the two capabilities, and the Weighted 
Additive is the weighted average. Similarly, the Multiplicative function is the multiplicative 
average of the two capabilities (the “geometric mean”), and the Weighted Multiplicative is the 
weighted multiplicative average (the “weighted geometric mean”).ii Readers interested in the 
detailed calculations will find them in Table A1. 
     Turning to the resource allocation decision, Table A2 examines the alternatives for Ruby, 
comparing the results for a one-unit increase of Ruby’s capability in Making or Selling. Table A2 
shows that if the performance function is Additive, it does not matter whether Ruby gains a one-
unit capability in Making or Selling: the “New TSC” column shows that either will increase TSC 
to 5.50, an increase of 10%. If the performance function is Weighted Additive, Ruby prefers to 
gain a new unit of capability in Selling: this increases TSC from 6.20 to 6.90 (+11.3%), whereas a 
new unit of capability in Making increases TSC from 6.20 to 6.50 (+4.8%).  
 
– INSERT TABLE A2 ABOUT HERE – 
 
     In either of the multiplicative functions, Ruby prefers to gain a new unit of capability in 
Making. Despite the fact that Ruby prioritizes Selling (priority = .7) over Making (priority = .3), 
and has more capability in Selling than Making, it should allocate resources to Making. In a 
multiplicative system, weak activities multiply through the performance system as a whole.  
 
NOTES 
                                                            
i Averaging keeps the range of Total Strategic Capital within the 0 to 10 scale of the underlying 
capabilities. Thus, if the variables have values 6 and 8, the sum is 14, which is outside the 0 to 10 
scale. Averaging the scores preserves the additive logic while making the scale more intuitive. 
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ii Intuitively, an “additive mean” (or “arithmetic mean”) implies that the two variables are perfect 
substitutes for each other (to raise the mean, it does not matter which variable is increased); a 
“geometric mean” implies that the two variables are not perfect substitutes (increasing the lower 
value gives a different mean than increasing the higher value). Arithmetically, the “additive 
mean” adds the values and divides by the number of values, and the “geometric mean” 
multiplies the values and raises them to an exponent equal to 1/(the number of values). If the 
two values are 8 and 2, the additive mean is (8+2)/2 = 5; the geometric mean is (8x2)½ (square 
root of 16) = 4.  
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TABLE A1: 
COMPUTING TSC FOR RUBY AND INDIGO 
 
 
Ruby: Capabilities and Priorities 
Fundamental Activity Capability Priority 
Making 2 0.30 
Selling 8 0.70 
      
Performance Function 
TSC 
Index TSC Calculation 
Additive (Average) 5.00 10 ÷ 2 = 5 
Weighted Additive (Weighted Average) 6.20 2(.30) + 8(.70) = 6.20 
Multiplicative (Multiplicative Average) 4.00 (2).50 x  (8).50 = 4.00 
Weighted Multiplicative (Weighted Multiplicative Average) 5.28 (2).30 x  (8).70 = 5.28 
 
 
Indigo: Capabilities and Priorities 
Fundamental Activity Capability Priority 
Making 6 0.20 
Selling 4 0.80 
      
Performance Function 
TSC 
Index TSC Calculation 
Additive (Average) 5.00 10 ÷ 2 = 5 
Weighted Additive (Weighted Average) 4.40 6(.20) + 4(.80) = 4.40 
Multiplicative (Multiplicative Average) 4.90 (6).50 x  (4).50 = 4.90 
Weighted Multiplicative (Weighted Multiplicative Average) 4.33 (6).20 x  (4).80 = 4.33 
 
 
 
Definitions of TSC Calculations 
Additive (Average) Average of the two Capabilities 
Weighted Additive 
(Weighted Average) Weighted average of the two Capabilities 
Multiplicative 
(Multiplicative Average) 
Product of the two Capabilities, equally weighted by exponents 
("geometric mean") 
Weighted Multiplicative 
(Weighted Multiplicative 
Average) 
Product of the two Capabilities, exponents weighted by 
priority ("weighted geometric mean") 
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TABLE A2: 
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS FOR RUBY 
 
 
Total Strategic Capital (TSC) Adding One Unit of Capability in MAKING 
Performance 
Function Making Selling  
Old 
TSC 
New 
TSC TSC Calculation 
TSC 
Change 
% 
Change 
Additive 3 8 5.00 5.50 (3 + 8) ÷ 2 = 5.50 +.50 10.0% 
Weighted 
Additive 3 8 6.20 6.50 3(.30) + 8(.70) = 6.50 +.30 4.8% 
Multiplicative 3 8 4.00 4.90 (3).50 x  (8).50 = 4.90 +.90 22.5% 
Weighted 
Multiplicative 3 8 5.28 5.96 (3).30 x  (8).70 = 5.96 +.68 12.9% 
 
 
Total Strategic Capital (TSC) Adding One Unit of Capability in SELLING 
Performance 
Function Making Selling 
Old 
TSC 
New 
TSC TSC Calculation 
TSC 
Change 
% 
Change 
Additive 2 9 5.00 5.50 (2 + 9) ÷ 2 = 5.50 +.50 10.0% 
Weighted 
Additive 2 9 6.20 6.90 2(.30) + 9(.70) = 6.90 +.70 11.3% 
Multiplicative 2 9 4.00 4.24 (2).50 x  (9).50 = 4.24 +.24 6.0% 
Weighted 
Multiplicative 2 9 5.28 5.73 (2).30 x  (9).70 = 5.73 +.45 8.5% 
 
 
 
Definitions of TSC Calculations 
Additive (Average) Average of the two Capabilities 
Weighted Additive 
(Weighted Average) Weighted average of the two Capabilities 
Multiplicative 
(Multiplicative Average) 
Product of the two Capabilities, equally weighted by exponents 
("geometric mean") 
Weighted Multiplicative 
(Weighted Multiplicative 
Average) 
Product of the two Capabilities, exponents weighted by 
priority ("weighted geometric mean") 
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SIDEBAR: ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE PERFORMANCE 
 
     Managers should understand the difference between resource allocation in Additive and 
Multiplicative systems. An Additive function is illustrated below. Goldenrod Company has two 
activities – Developing New Products and Serving Customers – and managers have assigned 
them equal priority. The company’s starting capabilities are shown at point G (3,1). 
     If the company could gain six new units of capability, any point between A and B would be 
achievable. How should it apportion these units between Developing New Products and Serving 
Customers? In an Additive function, it does not matter: Goldenrod will achieve 10 total units of 
capability (TSC = 5.0) for any allocation on line segment AB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     A Multiplicative function is shown in the curve below. How should Goldenrod Company 
apportion six new units of capability? As before, any point on line segment AB is achievable. 
However, only one allocation – the allocation that takes them to point C – allows Goldenrod to 
achieve TSC = 5. Any other allocation places the company on a lower TSC curve.  
     To reach point C, Goldenrod must allocate two units to Developing new Products and four 
units to Serving Customers; then its capabilities in the two activities will be (5,5) and total 
strategic capital will be 5. 
     Resource allocations depend on the priorities of activities and the company’s existing 
capabilities. Goldenrod’s activities had equal priority, but its capabilities (3,1) were unequal. TSC 
could only be maximized by allocating more resources to the weaker capability.  
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FIGURE 2: 
CHARTING DILIGENCE-BASED STRATEGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
8
3
8
5 4.73
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
4
8
3
8
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Developing
Products
Improving
Productivity
Developing
Culture
Marketing to
Consumers
Building
Relationships
with Retailers
Page 42 of 44
UC Berkeley, CMR, 2000 Center Street, Suite 400, Berkeley, CA 94704-1996
California Management Review (cmr.berkeley.edu)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Capabilities and Priorities 
Fundamental Activity Capability Priority 
Developing Products 4 0.20 
Improving Productivity 8 0.15 
Developing Culture 3 0.25 
Marketing to Consumers 8 0.10 
Building Relationships with Retailers 5 0.30 
Sum 28 1.00 
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TABLE 1: 
ALLOCATING RESOURCES TO ACTIVITIES 
 
 
Relative Capabilities and Priorities 
Fundamental Activity Capability 
Relative 
Capability 
Relative 
Priority 
Capability < 
Priority? 
Developing Products 4 0.14 0.20  
Improving Productivity 8 0.29 0.15   
Developing Culture 3 0.11 0.25  
Marketing to 
Consumers 8 0.29 0.10   
Building Relationships 
with Retailers 5 0.18 0.30  
Sum 28 1.00 1.00   
 
 
 
 
Page 44 of 44
UC Berkeley, CMR, 2000 Center Street, Suite 400, Berkeley, CA 94704-1996
California Management Review (cmr.berkeley.edu)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
